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Abstract—In this paper, we propose an algorithm that targets
contamination and eavesdropping adversaries. We consider the
case when the number of independent packets available to the
eavesdropper is less than the multicast capacity of the network.
By means of our algorithm every node can verify the integrity
of the received packets easily and an eavesdropper is unable
to get any “meaningful information”about the source. We call
it “practical security”if an eavesdropper is unable to get any
meaningful information about the source. We show that, by giving
up a small amount of overall capacity, our algorithm achieves
achieves the practically secure condition at a probability of one,
which is much higher than that of Bhattad and Narayanan’s [1].
Furthermore, the communication overhead of our algorithm are
negligible compared with previous works, since the transmission
of the hash values and the code coefficients are both avoided.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of network coding was first introduced by
Ahlswede et al. [2]. They showed that multicast rates could
be increased by allowing for network coding instead of just
routing. Shortly afterwards, Li, Yeung and Cai [3] showed that
it is sufficient for the encoding functions at the interior nodes
to be linear. Ho et al. [4] and [5] proposed a random coding
scheme in which the message on outgoing edges of a node
are chosen to be a random linear combination of the message
on its incoming edges.
In reality, network transmission may suffer from two kinds
of adversaries: contamination and eavesdropping. Network
coding has been studied to con-quer these two kinds of
adversaries. Ho et al. [6] considered the problem of network
coding in the presence of Byzantine attacker. Gkantsidis et
al. [7] also considered the related problem. Jaggi et al.
[8] designed a resilient network coding algorithm which is
information-theoretically secure and rate-optimal for different
adversarial strengths. Homomorphic hashing function was first
proposed in [9], which allows nodes to check blocks on-the-
fly in a system where content is encoded at the source using
rateless codes. However, the total size of the hash values of
their scheme is proportional to the number of blocks, which
could be very large and the cryptographic hash function is
computationally expensive. Li et al. [10] employed a batch
content distribution verification scheme, which reduced the
computational cost of each node to cache and scan all the
received packets when computing a new packet. The cryp-
tographic hash function of their scheme is computationally
inexpensive compared with which in [9]. Unfortunately, their
scheme deviate from the classical network coding scheme,
which is bandwidth consumed and delay could be induced at
the sinks. On the other hand, although batching can decrease
the computation time, batching block verification has the risk
of letting some malicious packets propagate since packets are
exchanged without being checked. Thus, standard batching
techniques do not work well with network coding. Zhao et
al. [11] presented a signature scheme with low computation,
but their scheme required long start-up latency. Finally, all
the works presented above have to distribute the coefficients
which is bandwidth consumed.
Cai and Yeung [12] considered the problem of using net-
work coding to achieve perfect information security against
an eavesdropper who can eavesdrop on a limited number
of network links, and presented the construction of a secure
linear network code for this purpose. A similar problem was
considered in [13] featuring a random coding approach in
which only the input vector is modified.
Bhattad and Narayanan [1] first defined a model for security
that is more suitable for practical applications. In this paper,
we also consider this type of model, which is not information
theoretically secure, but is secure enough for the application.
An interesting observation made in [14] was that for a compu-
tation limited eavesdropper with the use of one way function it
is possible to transmit at a high rate without the eavesdropper
getting any meaningful information about the source. A more
general threat posed by intermediate nodes was considered in
[15].
In this paper, we consider these two kinds of adversaries
at the same time, that is, the adversary can contaminate the
transmission on a subset of channels, and at the same time
eavesdrop on another subset of channels with cardinality less
than or equal to the multicast capacity of the network. Ngai
and Yang [16] studied the similar problem and constructed a
secure error-correcting network codes.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose an
algorithm, which can not only verify the integrity of the
received packets easily but also achieve the practically secure
condition at a probability of one. In our scheme, we use the
public parameters as the “intended”hash values. The original
packets are padded so that they are hashed to the public
parameters. In this way the transmission of the hash values
is avoided. The code coefficients in our scheme are generated
in a pseudo-random number generator in each node, so the
distribution of the coefficients is also avoided. We show
that the communication overhead and the start-up latency are
negligible since the transmission of the hash values and the
coefficients are both avoided.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
give the notations used in this paper. The secure network
coding scheme is proposed in section III. In Section IV, we
present the security of our algorithm. Overhead and start-up
latency of our scheme are discussed in Section V. Finally, this
paper is concluded in section VI.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND NOTIONS
In this paper, we assume that all the messages and co-
efficients are generated in Fp, where p is a large enough
prime number. we shall use small letters x,y etc. to denote
vectors whose dimensions will be clear from the context. The
matrices are denoted by the capital letters such as X, Xˆetc. The
transpose operator of vectors and matrices will be denoted by
“T ”thus xT will stand for column vectors.
A. Network Model
We represent a network by a directed graph G = (V ;E),
where V is the set of vertices (nodes) and E is the set of edges
(channels). We assume an order on V which is consistent with
the associated partial order on G. A network code is said to
be linear if the message on any outgoing edge of any node is
a linear combination of the messages on the incoming edges
of the node.
In this paper, we assume that the source node sends infor-
mation X of the following form:
X =


x11 x12 . . . x1n
x21 x22 . . . x2n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
xm1 xm2 . . . xmn

 =


x1
x2
.
.
.
xm

 (1)
We call xi,i = 1, . . . ,m a packet.
Therefore, for a linear code the message on edge ej ∈ E
can be written as FejX where Fej is a length m vector over
Fp(we call it global encoding kernel in this paper ) on edge
ej ∈ E.
B. Threat Model
There is a source, Alice, and a destination, Bob, who
communicate over a wired or wireless network. There is also
an eavesdropper Calvin, hidden somewhere in the network. He
aims to eavesdrop on the transfer of information from Alice
to Bob and injects his own. A malicious node can generate
corrupted packets and then distribute them to other nodes,
which in turn use them to (unintentionally) create new encoded
packets that are also corrupted. A wiretap network is specified
by a collection A of sets of edges A = {A1, A2, . . . , A|A|},
Ai ∈ E. Calvin selects a particular set Ai ∈ A and listens
to all messages transmitted on edges in Ai to get some
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Fig. 1. Networks
information. We assume that the set doesn’t change with time.
When we are specified a linear code and a wiretap network we
use Ai to represent a matrix whose rows contain all linearly
independent global encoding kernel corresponding to edge
ej ∈ Ai. In this case, the messages available to Calvin is
AiX. The number of rows in Ai is represented by ki. We
define k as maxiki.
C. Notions
1) : The network capacity is the time-average of the
maximum number of packets that can be delivered from Alice
to Bob, assuming no adversarial interference, i.e., the max-
flow. To simplify notion, in this paper, we assume the max-
flow from Alice to Bob is m.
2) : Practical security: Consider a set of messages M . Let
U be subset of the set containing the multicast information X.
We say that M has no information about U if I(U ;M) = 0.
We say that M has no meaningful information about U if
I(xi;M) = 0, ∀xi ∈ U . In this paper we concentrate on
two special cases and generalize the results towards the end.
We say that Calvin has no information about the source if
I(X ;M) = 0 where M is the set of messages that Calvin
chooses to observe. The security condition considered by Cai
and Yeung [12] falls in this category. We will use Shannon
security to refer to this security requirement. The second case
we consider is when Calvin gets no meaningful information
about the source i.e.I(xi;M) = 0, ∀xi for messages M
observed by Calvin. We call this type of security as practical
security.
It is noted that if Alice transmits a linear transformation
of X, PX, instead of X then the message transmitted on
edge ej would be FejPX(P is a m × m matrix which
is unknown to Calvin). In this case, although Calvin has
some information about the source he is unable to get any
meaningful information.
As shown in Fig.1, let us assume that Calvin can listen to
any one edge of this network. The multicast capacity for this
network is 2. x1 and x2 are the messages of Alice. In Fig.1 (a),
w is a uniform random sequence independent of the messages.
This is an example of the coding scheme constructed by Cai
and Yeung [12]. Obviously, the maximum multicast capacity
supported is 1 when this system has to be Shannon secure.
When the security condition is relaxed to practical security, as
shown in Fig.1 (b), the max-flow can be achieved.
III. SECURE NETWORK CODING
A. The Homomorphic Hash Function
We first choose the hash parameters q, g. Let o(x ) denote
the order of x in the field Fq . Here we choose o(g) = p in
Fq(Fpis a subfield of Fq). Furthermore we randomly select
n+2 numbers u0,u1,· · ·,un,un+1 from Fp. Next, we compute
gi = g
ui (mod q) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n + 1. The public
parameter of the hash function is p,q ,g0,g1,· · ·,gn+1. Whereas
u0,u1,· · ·,un+1 and g should be kept secret.
Formally, we define DL[g, p, q] to be the computational
problem: Given y, g and q, where o(g) = p in Fq , find x
such that y = gx (mod q). Hence, we have
Lemma 1: Given g0,g1,· · ·,gn+1, and the public parame-
ters p,q, it is computationally infeasible for a node to find
u0,u1,· · ·,un+1, such that gi = gui (mod q) if DL[g, p, q] is
hard.
Assume that each message is of the form:
x = (x0,x1,· · ·,xn, r) where xi, r ∈ Fp for 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
and the hash of x is computed as
H (x) = (
n∏
i=0
gi
xi)grn+1 (mod q) (2)
Based on this construction, we have
H (x) = g(
Pn
i=0
uixi+un+1r) (mod p) (mod q) (3)
For any two messages x = (x0, x1, · · · , xn, r1) and
y = (y0, y1, · · · , yn, r2), we define the addition of x and y as
x + y = (z0, z1, · · · , zn, r) (4)
where r = (r1 + r2) (mod p) and zi = (xi + yi)
(mod p) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n
Hence, this hash function has the following hommorphic
property
H (x)H (y) = H (x + y) (5)
The security of H is defined in terms of the difficulty in
finding collisions. It can be shown that the hash function is
indeed collision free if DL[g, p, q] is hard. In particular we
have:
Lemma 2: The hash function H is collision-free (namely
it is computationally infeasible to find two different messages
x1 and x2 such that H (x1) = H (x2) if DL[g, p, q] is hard.
It can be proved that the hash function is indeed collision-
free, using an argument in [17] (proof of Theorem 3.4).
B. Alice’s Encoder and Bob’s Decoder
Alice′s encoder : Alice encodes X in the following steps.
She first chooses m parity symbols rd, for d ∈ {1, · · · ,m}
uniformly at random from the field Fp and then generates a
Vandermonde matrix P as follows
P =


r1 r2 . . . rm
r21 r
2
2 . . . r
2
m
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
rm1 r
m
2 . . . r
m
m

 (6)
In the second step, Alice per-multiplies the source message
X with P
X
′
= PX =


x
′
11 x
′
12 . . . x
′
1n
x
′
21 x
′
22 . . . x
′
2n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
x
′
m1 x
′
m2 . . . x
′
mn

 =


x
′
1
x
′
2
.
.
.
x
′
m


(7)
In the third step, Alice adds r1, r2, . . . , rm to X
′
and gets
X
′′
as follows
X
′′
=


x
′
11 x
′
12 . . . x
′
1n r1
x
′
21 x
′
22 . . . x
′
2n r2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
x
′
m1 x
′
m2 . . . x
′
mn rm

 =


x
′′
1
x
′′
2
.
.
.
x
′′
m

 (8)
Alice uses gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m (it is possible since any
practical network coding system would make m≪ n ) as the
“intended”hash values of x′′1 , x
′′
2 , . . . , x
′′
m . A list of padding
x10, x20, . . . , xm0 can be computed. We add the padding to
every packet and get X̂ as show in Fig 1.
When a message packet x′′i is padded with xi0 to form the
new packet x̂i, then H (x̂i) = gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Bob′s decoder : Bob first decodes X̂ and gets
r1, r2, . . . , rm. The Vandermonde matrix P can be computed
from r1, r2, . . . , rm. Bob then per-multiplies the associated
matrix PX with P−1 and gets the original packet X.
C. The Basic Verification Scheme
As show in Fig.1, It is noted that the message can only
be padded using the secret key that is known only by Alice.
Next, Alice chooses a seed c and feed it to a pseudo-random
generator G. Instead of choosing the coefficients, the source
uses the random numbers c1, c2, . . . , cm generated by G as the
“intended”coefficients. Since the coefficients can be computed
from the public function G, there would be no need to
distribute the coefficients, and it suffices if all the nodes know
c.
Our proposed scheme consists of two algorithms, namely
the encoding algorithm and the verification algorithm.
Encoding Algorithm : The encoder performs the fol-
lowing steps
1) Choose a random seed c.
1 , , mg g!
1 , , mc c!
1 , , mc c!
Source
Node
0 1 1, , , ng g g !
0 1 1, , , ng g g !
Distribute to all nodes
11 12 1 1
21 22 2 2
1 2
X =
n
n
m m mn m
x x x r
x x x r
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"
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 Homomorphic Hash Function
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Pseudo-random   
 generator
generator
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Fig. 2. The basic verification scheme
2) Generate pseudo-random numbers c1,c2,· · ·,cmfrom G
with c.
3) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, choose gi = gui (mod q) as the
“intended”hash values.
4) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, compute xi0 = {ui−
∑n
j=1 xijuj−
un+1r}u
−1
0 (mod p).
5) Let Xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆm)T , where xˆi =
(xi0, xi1, · · · , xin, ri) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
6) Output x, c and the public parameter g0, g1, · · · , gn+1
p, q. Where x is the linear combination x=
∑m
i=1 cixˆi.
Verification Algorithm : During verification, each node
is given a packet x and public information t. In the case
where this packet is not tampered with, x is the linear
combination x=
∑m
i=1 cixˆi, and t represents public parameters
g0, g1, · · · , gn+1, p, q and c.
Each node can verify the integrity of the packet as follows
1) From c, compute c1,c2,· · ·,cm
2) Compute the hash value H1 = H (x).
3) Compute the hash value H2 =
∏m
i=1 hi
ci (mod q),
(hi = gi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m)
4) Verify that H1 = H2
In our scheme, every node selects and distributes random
values to all its following nodes instead of the transmission of
the coefficients. The coefficients are generated from a shared
pseudo-random number generator in each node and the global
encoding kernel can be calculated recursively in any upstream
to downstream order.
In practice, the need for distributing random values can
be further eliminated by using a public random function. For
example, it can be the SHA-1 hash of the original file identifier,
creation date, publisher, and other data that are public and
should be known to all the receivers before the download
session begins.
Our verification scheme enables the nodes to check the
integrity of packets without the requirement for a secure
channel. Also, the computation involved in the hash values
generation and verification processes is very simple.
IV. SECURITY OF OUR ALGORITHM
A. Security against the contamination adversaries
It can be shown that the basic verification scheme is indeed
secure if DL[g, p, q] is hard, using an argument similar to that
in [10] (proof of Theorem 3).
Theorem 1: It is computationally infeasible to find Xˆ =
(xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆm)
T
, y and c = (c1,c2,· · ·,cm) such that for
x=
∑m
i=1 cixˆi, we have y 6= x and H (x) = H (y), namely
the basic scheme is secure if DL[g, p, q] is hard.
Proof: We prove this theorem by showing that if there is a
polynomial time algorithm A that finds Xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆm)T
y and c = (c1,c2,· · ·,cm) such that for x=
∑m
i=1 cixˆi we
have y 6= x and H (x) = H (y)) with probability p that
is not negligible, we can use it to construct a polynomial time
algorithm B that find a collision x and y in H with the same
probability p which is not negligible.
However, if DL[g, p, q] is hard, Lemma 2 show that the hash
function H is collision free, and thus p should be negligible,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, the basic schemes are
secure if the discrete logarithm DL[g, p, q] is hard.
B. Security against the eavesdropping adversaries
Theorem 2: Given a network that the number of indepen-
dent message available to Calvin is less than the multicast
capacity i.e.k = maxiki < m. The algorithm in section-B
achieves the practically secure condition at a probability of
one when random code is used.
Proof: In our algorithm, Alice transmits Xˆ instead of X,
so the message available to Calvin is AiXˆ. As long as Calvin
doesn’t get r1, r2, . . . , rm from AiXˆ, he can’t get the global
encoding kernel about X, and still can’t get any meaningful
information about X without the global encoding kernel about
X. So by taking linear combinations of the observed packets
AiXˆ Calvin shouldn’t be able to recover r1, r2, . . . , rm which
implies
biAiXˆ 6= IXˆ(∀bi, i) (9)
where bi is a ki × m matrix in Fpm and I is an m × m
identity matrix.
Since the number of independent messages available to the
eavesdropper is less than the multicast capacity of the network,
the condition (9) can always be satisfied.
Moreover, Calvin can’t get any packet of X by only getting
the value r1, r2, . . . , rm which implies
biAiP 6= Im,n(∀bi, n, i) (10)
Multiplying both sides by P−1, we have
biAi 6= Im,nP
−1(∀bi, n, i) (11)
Where Im,n is the nth row of an m×m identity matrix and
bi is a ki×m matrix in Fpm . The above condition is satisfied
if each row of P−1 is not in the row space of each Ai.
ours [9] [10] [11]
Communication Overhead 0.48% 3.23%. >2.44% 4.86%
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Fig. 3. Comparisons of Communication Overhead and Start-Up Latency
Theorem 3: In a network that supports a multicast capacity
of m, if at most k (k < m) edges can be tapped simulta-
neously then the multicast capacity under practical security
requirements is m − 2m
n
(Here, the asymptotically negligible
term 2m
n
corresponds to the overhead due to the redundancy
Alice appends to Xˆ ).
Proof: The network supports a multicast capacity of m so
a linear code can be found to multicast m packets [3]. From
theorem 2 a transformation at the source can be applied to
make it practical security.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we examine the overhead and the start-
up latency induced by our scheme. For fair comparisons, we
choose n=410, |p| = 320 and |q| = 1024 in the follow
discussion. The size of every packet is 16KB. What’s more,
we assume that the original file is divided into m=10 packets.
The comparisons are shown in Fig.3
A. Communication Overhead
The communication overhead is caused by two parts of
parameters. The first part refers to the amount of data we need
to distribute to each node for the security of our scheme. The
second part is the code coefficients. The actual communication
overhead largely depends on the parameters chosen for the
actual implementations.
In the scheme proposed by Krohn [9], the parameters chosen
for the homomorphic hash function would generate a hash
value of size 1024 bits per packet. The total size of coefficients
is 3200 bits per packet. Hence, the total size of the “first-
order”hash values and the coefficients would be 3.22% of the
original data. For a file of size 1 GB, their method would
require hash values of size 8 MB. To distribute these hash
values, the authors in Krohn [9] proposed to recursively apply
the same scheme on the 8 MB hash values, which would
generate more “second ”or higher order of hash values. The
size of the high order hash values constitutes 0.01% of the
size of the original data. Hence the total overhead is 3.23%.
In the scheme proposed by Zhao [11], if the file is divided
into 10 packets, each packet is a vector in Fq. The size of
each packet is also about 16KB. The size of each augmented
vector (with coding vectors in the front) is about 16.4KB,
and thus, the overhead of each packet is 2.43%. On the other
hand, after the initial setup, the scheme of [11] has to publish
3200 bits for the new signature vector for the security of their
scheme. Thus the total overhead of their scheme is 4.86%. In
conclusion, although they proposed a simple signature scheme,
the communication overhead of their scheme is very high.
The scheme in [10] required padding of three values and
they should also distribute the coefficients. The overhead
caused by the coefficients themselves is 2.44%. Therefore the
communication overhead of their scheme is higher than us,
although they use the technical of batching verification. In our
scheme, the coefficients are generated from a pseudo-random
number generator in each node so the distribution of them is
avoided.
The communication overhead of our scheme is only caused
by padding we add in every packet. Each packet distributed
only incurs 0.48% overhead which is negligible compared with
previous works. Formally, Let the file size be S and each
one of which is a vector in Fp. The size of each vector is
B = nlog(p) and we have S = mnlog(p). The size of each
augmented vector (with the padding in the front and the back)
is Ba = (n+2)log(p), and thus, the overhead of the packet is
2
n
times the file size. Note that the communication overhead
of our scheme is asymptotically negligible.
B. Start-Up Latency
At the beginning of a content distribution session, the source
and all the nodes participating in the distribution have to agree
on the set of parameters used for the coding and verification.
The public parameters in our scheme are p,q ,g0,g1,· · ·,gn+1
and the total size of the public parameters is approximately
16.3 KB. With these parameters it would be sufficient for any
node to perform verification. Assuming that the bandwidth
between a node and the source (or any other node from which
these parameters are distributed) is 1 Mbps, it would take
less than 0.127 seconds before the node is ready to perform
verification. The start-up latency in our scheme is fixed once
the parameters for the hash function and the block size are
chosen, and is independent of the size of the content to be
distributed. The start-up latency of [10] is 0.127 seconds, more
or less the same with us. For the scheme in [9], the size of
all the public parameters is the same as the size of the data
in a packet, which is 16 KB. It takes 0.125 seconds to be
transmitted on the same link. However, when the node needs
to receive 8 MB hash values of a 1 GB file as in the example
given in [9], it would require 64 seconds, with the same 1
Mbps link. The start-up latency is proportional with the size
of the file. The public parameters of [11] consist of two parts:
the public parameters and the signature vectors. The size of
their public parameters is 32.8KB and it takes 0.25 seconds
to be transmitted on the same link. Father more they have to
publish new signature vectors for the security of their scheme
in every setup.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the security issues that arise
from using network coding and propose a secure algorithm.
By means of our algorithm every node can verify the integrity
of the received packets easily and an eavesdropper is unable
to get any meaningful information about the source. We show
that when we give up a small amount of overall capacity, the
practically secure condition can be achieved at a probability
of 1, which is much higher than that of [1]. We also propose a
new paradigm where the public parameters are selected as the
“intended”hash values and the code coefficients are generated
in a pseudo-random number generator in every node. In this
way the distribution of the hash values and the coefficients are
avoided. We have shown that the communication overhead of
our algorithm is 2
n
, which is negligible compared with previous
works and the start-up latency is transitory.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The work of Yejun Zhou, Hui Li and Jianfeng Ma was
supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China
grant 60772136, National Natural Science Foundation of
China grant 60633020, 863 Hi-Tech Research and Devel-
opment Program of China grant 2007AA01Z435, and 863
Hi-Tech Research and Development Program of China grant
2007AA01Z429.
REFERENCES
[1] K. Bhattad and K.R. Narayanan, “Weakly secure network coding,”In
Proc. of the First Workshop on Network Coding, Theory, and Applica-
tions (NetCod), Riva del Garda, Italy, 2005.
[2] R. Ahlswede, N. Cai, S.-Y. R. Li, and R. W. Yeung, “Network informa-
tion flow,”IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 46(4), pp. 1204-1216, 2000.
[3] S.-Y. R. Li, R. W. Yeung, and N. Cai, “Linear network coding,”IEEE
Trans. on Informa-tion Theory, vol. IT-49, pp. 371-381, 2003.
[4] T. Ho, R. Koetter, M. Me´dard, D. R. Karger, and M. Effros, “The
benefits of coding over routing in a randomized setting,”in International
Symposium on Infor-mation Theory (ISIT), 2003.
[5] T. Ho, M. Me´dard, J. Shi, M. Effros and D. R. Karger, “On randomized
network coding,”In proc. 41st Annual Allerton Conference on Commu-
nicationControl and Computing, Oct. 2003.
[6] T. C. Ho, B. Leong, R. Koetter, M. Me´dard, M. Effros, and D. R.
Karger, “Byzantine modification detection in multicast networks using
randomized network coding,”in International Symposium on Information
Theory,Chicago, USA, June 2004.
[7] C. Gkantsidis, J. Miller, P. Rodriguez, “Comprehensive View of a Live
Network Coding P2P System,”Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGCOMM
conference on Internet measurement Oct. 2006
[8] S. Jaggi, M. Langberg, S. Katti, T. Ho, D. Katabi, and M. Me´dard,
“Resilient network coding in the presence of Byzantine adver-
saries,”accepted to IEEE INFOCOM’07, Anchorage, Alaska, May 2007.
[9] M. N. Krohn, M. J. Freedman, and D. Mazie´res, “On-the-fly verification
of rateless era-sure codes for efficient content distribution,”IEEE Symp.
Security and Privacy, Oak-land, CA, pp. 226-240, May 2004.
[10] Qiming Li, Dah-Ming Chiu, John C.S. Lui, “On the Practical and
Security Issues of Batch Content Distribution Via Network Coding,”14th
IEEE International Conference (ICNP ’06) pp. 158 - 167, Nov 2006.
[11] Fang Zhao, Ton Kalker, M. Me´dard, and Keesook J. Han, “Signatures
for content distribution with network coding,”ISIT2007, Nice, France,
June 24 - June 29, 2007
[12] N. Cai and R. W. Yeung, “Secure network coding,”International Sym-
posium on Information Theory (ISIT) Lausanne, Switzerland, June 30 -
July 5, 2002.
[13] J. Feldman, T. Malkin, C. Stein, R. A. Servedio “On the capacity of
secure network coding,”In Proc. 42nd Annual Allerton Conference on
Communication, Control, and Computing, Sep. 2004.
[14] K. Jain, “Security based on network topology against the wiretapping
attack,”IEEE Wireless Communications, pp. 68-71, Feb, 2004.
[15] L Lima, M. Me´dard, J Barros, “Random linear network coding: A
free cipher?”In Proc. of IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory (ISIT), Nice, France, June 24-29 2007.
[16] Ngai. Chi Kin, Yang. Shenghao, “Deterministic Secure Error-Correcting
(SEC) Network Codes,”IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW), pp.
96 - 101, Sept2-6 2007.
[17] M. Bellare, O. Goldreich, and S. Goldwasser, “Incremental cryptogra-
phy:The case of hashing and signing,”CRYPTO, 1994.
ar
X
iv
:0
80
5.
22
86
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
5 M
ay
 20
08
Secure Network Coding Against the Contamination
and Eavesdropping Adversaries
Yejun Zhou, Hui Li and Jianfeng Ma
Key lab of CNIS Ministry of Education
Xidian University
Xi’an, Shanxi 710071, China
Email: {yjzhou, lihui, jfma}@mail.xidian.edu.cn
Abstract—In this paper, we propose an algorithm that targets
contamination and eavesdropping adversaries. We consider the
case when the number of independent packets available to the
eavesdropper is less than the multicast capacity of the network.
By means of our algorithm every node can verify the integrity
of the received packets easily and an eavesdropper is unable
to get any “meaningful information”about the source. We call
it “practical security”if an eavesdropper is unable to get any
meaningful information about the source. We show that, by giving
up a small amount of overall capacity, our algorithm achieves
achieves the practically secure condition at a probability of one,
which is much higher than that of Bhattad and Narayanan’s [1].
Furthermore, the communication overhead of our algorithm are
negligible compared with previous works, since the transmission
of the hash values and the code coefficients are both avoided.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of network coding was first introduced by
Ahlswede et al. [2]. They showed that multicast rates could
be increased by allowing for network coding instead of just
routing. Shortly afterwards, Li, Yeung and Cai [3] showed that
it is sufficient for the encoding functions at the interior nodes
to be linear. Ho et al. [4] and [5] proposed a random coding
scheme in which the message on outgoing edges of a node
are chosen to be a random linear combination of the message
on its incoming edges.
In reality, network transmission may suffer from two kinds
of adversaries: contamination and eavesdropping. Network
coding has been studied to con-quer these two kinds of
adversaries. Ho et al. [6] considered the problem of network
coding in the presence of Byzantine attacker. Gkantsidis et
al. [7] also considered the related problem. Jaggi et al.
[8] designed a resilient network coding algorithm which is
information-theoretically secure and rate-optimal for different
adversarial strengths. Homomorphic hashing function was first
proposed in [9], which allows nodes to check blocks on-the-
fly in a system where content is encoded at the source using
rateless codes. However, the total size of the hash values of
their scheme is proportional to the number of blocks, which
could be very large and the cryptographic hash function is
computationally expensive. Li et al. [10] employed a batch
content distribution verification scheme, which reduced the
computational cost of each node to cache and scan all the
received packets when computing a new packet. The cryp-
tographic hash function of their scheme is computationally
inexpensive compared with which in [9]. Unfortunately, their
scheme deviate from the classical network coding scheme,
which is bandwidth consumed and delay could be induced at
the sinks. On the other hand, although batching can decrease
the computation time, batching block verification has the risk
of letting some malicious packets propagate since packets are
exchanged without being checked. Thus, standard batching
techniques do not work well with network coding. Zhao et
al. [11] presented a signature scheme with low computation,
but their scheme required long start-up latency. Finally, all
the works presented above have to distribute the coefficients
which is bandwidth consumed.
Cai and Yeung [12] considered the problem of using net-
work coding to achieve perfect information security against
an eavesdropper who can eavesdrop on a limited number
of network links, and presented the construction of a secure
linear network code for this purpose. A similar problem was
considered in [13] featuring a random coding approach in
which only the input vector is modified.
Bhattad and Narayanan [1] first defined a model for security
that is more suitable for practical applications. In this paper,
we also consider this type of model, which is not information
theoretically secure, but is secure enough for the application.
An interesting observation made in [14] was that for a compu-
tation limited eavesdropper with the use of one way function it
is possible to transmit at a high rate without the eavesdropper
getting any meaningful information about the source. A more
general threat posed by intermediate nodes was considered in
[15].
In this paper, we consider these two kinds of adversaries
at the same time, that is, the adversary can contaminate the
transmission on a subset of channels, and at the same time
eavesdrop on another subset of channels with cardinality less
than or equal to m. Ngai and Yang [16] studied the similar
problem and constructed a secure error-correcting network
codes.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose an
algorithm, which can not only verify the integrity of the
received packets easily but also achieve the practically secure
condition at a probability of one. In our scheme, we use the
public parameters as the “intended”hash values. The original
packets are padded so that they are hashed to the public
parameters. In this way the transmission of the hash values
is avoided. The code coefficients in our scheme are generated
in a pseudo-random number generator in each node, so the
distribution of the coefficients is also avoided. We show
that the communication overhead and the start-up latency are
negligible since the transmission of the hash values and the
coefficients are both avoided.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
give the notations used in this paper. The secure network
coding scheme is proposed in section III. In Section IV, we
present the security of our algorithm. Overhead and start-up
latency of our algorithm are discussed in Section V. Finally,
this paper is concluded in section VI.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND NOTIONS
In this paper, we assume that all the messages and co-
efficients are generated in Fp, where p is a large enough
prime number. we shall use small letters x,y etc. to denote
vectors whose dimensions will be clear from the context. The
matrices are denoted by the capital letters such as X, Xˆetc. The
transpose operator of vectors and matrices will be denoted by
“T ”thus xT will stand for column vectors.
A. Network Model
We represent a network by a directed graph G = (V ;E),
where V is the set of vertices (nodes) and E is the set of edges
(channels). We assume an order on V which is consistent with
the associated partial order on G. A network code is said to
be linear if the message on any outgoing edge of any node is
a linear combination of the messages on the incoming edges
of the node.
In this paper, we assume that the source node sends infor-
mation X of the following form:
X =


x11 x12 . . . x1n
x21 x22 . . . x2n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
xm1 xm2 . . . xmn

 =


x1
x2
.
.
.
xm

 (1)
We call xi,i = 1, . . . ,m a packet.
Therefore, for a linear code the message on edge ej ∈ E
can be written as FejX where Fej is a length m vector over
Fp(we call it global encoding kernel in this paper ) on edge
ej ∈ E.
B. Threat Model
There is a source, Alice, and a destination, Bob, who
communicate over a wired or wireless network. There is also
an eavesdropper Calvin, hidden somewhere in the network. He
aims to eavesdrop on the transfer of information from Alice
to Bob and injects his own. A malicious node can generate
corrupted packets and then distribute them to other nodes,
which in turn use them to (unintentionally) create new encoded
packets that are also corrupted. A wiretap network is specified
by a collection A of sets of edges A = {A1, A2, . . . , A|A|},
Ai ∈ E. Calvin selects a particular set Ai ∈ A and listens
to all messages transmitted on edges in Ai to get some
1
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6 7
1 2x x 1 2x 2x
1 22x 3x
1
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Fig. 1. Networks
information. We assume that the set doesn’t change with time.
When we are specified a linear code and a wiretap network we
use Ai to represent a matrix whose rows contain all linearly
independent global encoding kernel corresponding to edge
ej ∈ Ai. In this case, the messages available to Calvin is
AiX. The number of rows in Ai is represented by ki. We
define k as maxiki.
C. Notions
1) : The network capacity is the time-average of the
maximum number of packets that can be delivered from Alice
to Bob, assuming no adversarial interference, i.e., the max-
flow. To simplify notion, in this paper, we assume the max-
flow from Alice to Bob is m.
2) : Practical security: Consider a set of messages M . Let
U be subset of the set containing the multicast information X.
We say that M has no information about U if I(U ;M) = 0.
We say that M has no meaningful information about U if
I(xi;M) = 0, ∀xi ∈ U . In this paper we concentrate on
two special cases and generalize the results towards the end.
We say that Calvin has no information about the source if
I(X ;M) = 0 where M is the set of messages that Calvin
chooses to observe. The security condition considered by Cai
and Yeung [12] falls in this category. We will use Shannon
security to refer to this security requirement. The second case
we consider is when Calvin gets no meaningful information
about the source i.e.I(xi;M) = 0, ∀xi for messages M
observed by Calvin. We call this type of security as practical
security.
It is noted that if Alice transmits a linear transformation
of X, PX, instead of X then the message transmitted on
edge ej would be FejPX(P is a m × m matrix which
is unknown to Calvin). In this case, although Calvin has
some information about the source he is unable to get any
meaningful information.
As shown in Fig.1, let us assume that Calvin can listen to
any one edge of this network. The multicast capacity for this
network is 2. x1 and x2 are the messages of Alice. In Fig.1 (a),
w is a uniform random sequence independent of the messages.
This is an example of the coding scheme constructed by Cai
and Yeung [12]. Obviously, the maximum multicast capacity
supported is 1 when this system has to be Shannon secure.
When the security condition is relaxed to practical security, as
shown in Fig.1 (b), the max-flow can be achieved.
III. SECURE NETWORK CODING
A. The Homomorphic Hash Function
We first choose the hash parameters q, g. Let o(x ) denote
the order of x in the field Fq . Here we choose o(g) = p in
Fq(Fpis a subfield of Fq). Furthermore we randomly select
n+2 numbers u0,u1,· · ·,un,un+1 from Fp. Next, we compute
gi = g
ui (mod q) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n + 1. The public
parameter of the hash function is p,q ,g0,g1,· · ·,gn+1. Whereas
u0,u1,· · ·,un+1 and g should be kept secret.
Formally, we define DL[g, p, q] to be the computational
problem: Given y, g and q, where o(g) = p in Fq , find x
such that y = gx (mod q). Hence, we have
Lemma 1: Given g0,g1,· · ·,gn+1, and the public parame-
ters p,q, it is computationally infeasible for a node to find
u0,u1,· · ·,un+1, such that gi = gui (mod q) if DL[g, p, q] is
hard.
Assume that each message is of the form:
x = (x0,x1,· · ·,xn, r) where xi, r ∈ Fp for 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
and the hash of x is computed as
H (x) = (
n∏
i=0
gi
xi)grn+1 (mod q) (2)
Based on this construction, we have
H (x) = g(
Pn
i=0
uixi+un+1r) (mod p) (mod q) (3)
For any two messages x = (x0, x1, · · · , xn, r1) and
y = (y0, y1, · · · , yn, r2), we define the addition of x and y as
x + y = (z0, z1, · · · , zn, r) (4)
where r = (r1 + r2) (mod p) and zi = (xi + yi)
(mod p) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n
Hence, this hash function has the following hommorphic
property
H (x)H (y) = H (x + y) (5)
The security of H is defined in terms of the difficulty in
finding collisions. It can be shown that the hash function is
indeed collision free if DL[g, p, q] is hard. In particular we
have:
Lemma 2: The hash function H is collision-free (namely
it is computationally infeasible to find two different messages
x1 and x2 such that H (x1) = H (x2) if DL[g, p, q] is hard.
It can be proved that the hash function is indeed collision-
free, using an argument in [17] (proof of Theorem 3.4).
B. Alice’s Encoder and Bob’s Decoder
Alice′s encoder : Alice encodes X in the following steps.
She first chooses m parity symbols rd, for d ∈ {1, · · · ,m}
uniformly at random from the field Fp and then generates a
Vandermonde matrix P as follows
P =


r1 r2 . . . rm
r21 r
2
2 . . . r
2
m
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
rm1 r
m
2 . . . r
m
m

 (6)
In the second step, Alice per-multiplies the source message
X with P
X
′
= PX =


x
′
11 x
′
12 . . . x
′
1n
x
′
21 x
′
22 . . . x
′
2n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
x
′
m1 x
′
m2 . . . x
′
mn

 =


x
′
1
x
′
2
.
.
.
x
′
m


(7)
In the third step, Alice adds r1, r2, . . . , rm to X
′
and gets
X
′′
as follows
X
′′
=


x
′
11 x
′
12 . . . x
′
1n r1
x
′
21 x
′
22 . . . x
′
2n r2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
x
′
m1 x
′
m2 . . . x
′
mn rm

 =


x
′′
1
x
′′
2
.
.
.
x
′′
m

 (8)
Alice uses gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m (it is possible since any
practical network coding system would make m≪ n ) as the
“intended”hash values of x′′1 , x
′′
2 , . . . , x
′′
m . A list of padding
x10, x20, . . . , xm0 can be computed. We add the padding to
every packet and get X̂ as show in Fig 1.
When a message packet x′′i is padded with xi0 to form the
new packet x̂i, then H (x̂i) = gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Bob′s decoder : Bob first decodes X̂ and gets
r1, r2, . . . , rm. The Vandermonde matrix P can be computed
from r1, r2, . . . , rm. Bob then per-multiplies the associated
matrix PX with P−1 and gets the original packet X.
C. The Basic Verification Scheme
As show in Fig.1, It is noted that the message can only
be padded using the secret key that is known only by Alice.
Next, Alice chooses a seed c and feed it to a pseudo-random
generator G. Instead of choosing the coefficients, the source
uses the random numbers c1, c2, . . . , cm generated by G as the
“intended”coefficients. Since the coefficients can be computed
from the public function G, there would be no need to
distribute the coefficients, and it suffices if all the nodes know
c.
Our proposed scheme consists of two algorithms, namely
the encoding algorithm and the verification algorithm.
Encoding Algorithm : The encoder performs the fol-
lowing steps
1) Choose a random seed c.
1 , , mg g!
1 , , mc c!
1 , , mc c!
Source
Node
0 1 1, , , ng g g !
0 1 1, , , ng g g !
Distribute to all nodes
11 12 1 1
21 22 2 2
1 2
X =
n
n
m m mn m
x x x r
x x x r
x x x r
c c c§ ·¨ ¸c c c¨ ¸cc ¨ ¸¨ ¸c c c© ¹
"
"
# # % # #
"
10 11 1 1
20 21 2 2
0 1
Xˆ=
n
n
m m mn m
x x x r
x x x r
x x x r
c c§ ·¨ ¸c c¨ ¸¨ ¸¨ ¸c c© ¹
"
#
# # % # #
"
 Homomorphic Hash Function
Perform padding
Pseudo-random   
Pseudo-random   
 generator
generator
Perform verification
Linear combination
seed
Fig. 2. The basic verification scheme
2) Generate pseudo-random numbers c1,c2,· · ·,cmfrom G
with c.
3) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, choose gi = gui (mod q) as the
“intended”hash values.
4) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, compute xi0 = {ui−
∑n
j=1 xijuj−
un+1r}u
−1
0 (mod p).
5) Let Xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆm)T , where xˆi =
(xi0, xi1, · · · , xin, ri) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
6) Output x, c and the public parameter g0, g1, · · · , gn+1
p, q. Where x is the linear combination x=
∑m
i=1 cixˆi.
Verification Algorithm : During verification, each node
is given a packet x and public information t. In the case
where this packet is not tampered with, x is the linear
combination x=
∑m
i=1 cixˆi, and t represents public parameters
g0, g1, · · · , gn+1, p, q and c.
Each node can verify the integrity of the packet as follows
1) From c, compute c1,c2,· · ·,cm
2) Compute the hash value H1 = H (x).
3) Compute the hash value H2 =
∏m
i=1 hi
ci (mod q),
(hi = gi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m)
4) Verify that H1 = H2
In our scheme, every node selects and distributes random
values to all its following nodes instead of the transmission of
the coefficients. The coefficients are generated from a shared
pseudo-random number generator in each node and the global
encoding kernel can be calculated recursively in any upstream
to downstream order.
In practice, the need for distributing random values can
be further eliminated by using a public random function. For
example, it can be the SHA-1 hash of the original file identifier,
creation date, publisher, and other data that are public and
should be known to all the receivers before the download
session begins.
Our verification scheme enables the nodes to check the
integrity of packets without the requirement for a secure
channel. Also, the computation involved in the hash values
generation and verification processes is very simple.
IV. SECURITY OF OUR ALGORITHM
A. Security against the contamination adversaries
It can be shown that the basic verification scheme is indeed
secure if DL[g, p, q] is hard, using an argument similar to that
in [10] (proof of Theorem 3).
Theorem 1: It is computationally infeasible to find Xˆ =
(xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆm)
T
, y and c = (c1,c2,· · ·,cm) such that for
x=
∑m
i=1 cixˆi, we have y 6= x and H (x) = H (y), namely
the basic scheme is secure if DL[g, p, q] is hard.
Proof: We prove this theorem by showing that if there is a
polynomial time algorithm A that finds Xˆ = (xˆ1, xˆ2, · · · , xˆm)T
y and c = (c1,c2,· · ·,cm) such that for x=
∑m
i=1 cixˆi we
have y 6= x and H (x) = H (y)) with probability p that
is not negligible, we can use it to construct a polynomial time
algorithm B that find a collision x and y in H with the same
probability p which is not negligible.
However, if DL[g, p, q] is hard, Lemma 2 show that the hash
function H is collision free, and thus p should be negligible,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, the basic schemes are
secure if the discrete logarithm DL[g, p, q] is hard.
B. Security against the eavesdropping adversaries
Theorem 2: Given a network that the number of indepen-
dent message available to Calvin is less than the multicast
capacity i.e.k = maxiki < m. The algorithm in section-B
achieves the practically secure condition at a probability of
one when random code is used.
Proof: In our algorithm, Alice transmits Xˆ instead of X,
so the message available to Calvin is AiXˆ. As long as Calvin
doesn’t get r1, r2, . . . , rm from AiXˆ, he can’t get the global
encoding kernel about X, and still can’t get any meaningful
information about X without the global encoding kernel about
X. So by taking linear combinations of the observed packets
AiXˆ Calvin shouldn’t be able to recover r1, r2, . . . , rm which
implies
biAiXˆ 6= IXˆ(∀bi, i) (9)
where bi is a ki × m matrix in Fpm and I is an m × m
identity matrix.
Since the number of independent messages available to the
eavesdropper is less than the multicast capacity of the network,
the condition (9) can always be satisfied.
Moreover, Calvin can’t get any packet of X by only getting
the value r1, r2, . . . , rm which implies
biAiP 6= Im,n(∀bi, n, i) (10)
Multiplying both sides by P−1, we have
biAi 6= Im,nP
−1(∀bi, n, i) (11)
Where Im,n is the nth row of an m×m identity matrix and
bi is a ki×m matrix in Fpm . The above condition is satisfied
if each row of P−1 is not in the row space of each Ai.
ours [9] [10] [11]
Communication Overhead 0.48% 3.23%. >2.44% 4.86%
Start-Up Latency 0.127s 0.125s 0.127s 0.25s
index 
paper
Fig. 3. Comparisons of Communication Overhead and Start-Up Latency
Theorem 3: In a network that supports a multicast capacity
of m, if at most k (k < m) edges can be tapped simulta-
neously then the multicast capacity under practical security
requirements is m − 2m
n
(Here, the asymptotically negligible
term 2m
n
corresponds to the overhead due to the redundancy
Alice appends to Xˆ ).
Proof: The network supports a multicast capacity of m so
a linear code can be found to multicast m packets [3]. From
theorem 2 a transformation at the source can be applied to
make it practical security.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we examine the overhead and the start-
up latency induced by our scheme. For fair comparisons, we
choose n=410, |p| = 320 and |q| = 1024 in the follow
discussion. The size of every packet is 16KB. What’s more,
we assume that the original file is divided into m=10 packets.
The comparisons are shown in Fig.3
A. Communication Overhead
The communication overhead is caused by two parts of
parameters. The first part refers to the amount of data we need
to distribute to each node for the security of our algorithm. The
second part is the code coefficients. The actual communication
overhead largely depends on the parameters chosen for the
actual implementations.
In the scheme proposed by Krohn [9], the parameters chosen
for the homomorphic hash function would generate a hash
value of size 1024 bits per packet. The total size of coefficients
is 3200 bits per packet. Hence, the total size of the “first-
order”hash values and the coefficients would be 3.22% of the
original data. For a file of size 1 GB, their method would
require hash values of size 8 MB. To distribute these hash
values, the authors in Krohn [9] proposed to recursively apply
the same scheme on the 8 MB hash values, which would
generate more “second ”or higher order of hash values. The
size of the high order hash values constitutes 0.01% of the
size of the original data. Hence the total overhead is 3.23%.
In the scheme proposed by Zhao [11], if the file is divided
into 10 packets, each packet is a vector in Fq. The size of
each packet is also about 16KB. The size of each augmented
vector (with coding vectors in the front) is about 16.4KB,
and thus, the overhead of each packet is 2.43%. On the other
hand, after the initial setup, the scheme of [11] has to publish
3200 bits for the new signature vector for the security of their
scheme. Thus the total overhead of their scheme is 4.86%. In
conclusion, although they proposed a simple signature scheme,
the communication overhead of their scheme is very high.
The scheme in [10] required padding of three values and
they should also distribute the coefficients. The overhead
caused by the coefficients themselves is 2.44%. Therefore the
communication overhead of their scheme is higher than us,
although they use the technical of batching verification. In our
scheme, the coefficients are generated from a pseudo-random
number generator in each node so the distribution of them
is avoided. The communication overhead of our scheme is
only caused by padding we add in every packet. Each packet
distributed only incurs 0.48% overhead which is negligible
compared with previous works.
B. Start-Up Latency
At the beginning of a content distribution session, the source
and all the nodes participating in the distribution have to agree
on the set of parameters used for the coding and verification.
The public parameters in our scheme are p,q ,g0,g1,· · ·,gn+1
and the total size of the public parameters is approximately
16.3 KB. With these parameters it would be sufficient for any
node to perform verification. Assuming that the bandwidth
between a node and the source (or any other node from which
these parameters are distributed) is 1 Mbps, it would take
less than 0.127 seconds before the node is ready to perform
verification. The start-up latency in our scheme is fixed once
the parameters for the hash function and the block size are
chosen, and is independent of the size of the content to be
distributed. The start-up latency of [10] is 0.127 seconds, more
or less the same with us. For the scheme in [9], the size of
all the public parameters is the same as the size of the data
in a packet, which is 16 KB. It takes 0.125 seconds to be
transmitted on the same link. However, when the node needs
to receive 8 MB hash values of a 1 GB file as in the example
given in [9], it would require 64 seconds, with the same 1
Mbps link. The start-up latency is proportional with the size
of the file. The public parameters of [11] consist of two parts:
the public parameters and the signature vectors. The size of
their public parameters is 32.8KB and it takes 0.25 seconds
to be transmitted on the same link. Father more they have to
publish new signature vectors for the security of their scheme
in every setup.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the security issues that arise
from using network coding and propose a secure algorithm.
By means of our algorithm every node can verify the integrity
of the received packets easily and an eavesdropper is unable
to get any meaningful information about the source. We show
that when we give up a small amount of overall capacity, the
practically secure condition can be achieved at a probability
of 1, which is much higher than that of [1]. We also propose a
new paradigm where the public parameters are selected as the
“intended”hash values and the code coefficients are generated
in a pseudo-random number generator in every node. In this
way the distribution of the hash values and the coefficients are
avoided. We have shown that the communication overhead of
our algorithm is 2
n
, which is negligible compared with previous
works and the start-up latency is transitory.
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